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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
Court of Appeals applies the doctrine of collateral estoppel to an
administrative determination
The principle of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,' has
been applied by courts to give preclusive effect to certain determi-
nations made by state administrative bodies. 2 In deciding when to
apply the doctrine, a court must focus on whether an earlier pro-
ceeding provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue
present before the court.3 Evolving from traditional notions of fair-
See 5 WK&M 7 5011.08 (1988). Issue preclusion, traditionally known as collateral
estoppel, is one of the narrower principles incorporated into the doctrine of res judicata. Id.
Issue preclusion bars subsequent litigation between the same parties, or those in privity
with them, of factual matters decided in a prior action by a tribunal of competent jurisdic-
tion. Id.; see also Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 467 N.E.2d 487, 490, 478
N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1984) (issue preclusion "precludes a party from relitigating ... an issue
clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in
privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same"). See generally RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (discussing issue
preclusion); 9 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTICE § 63:205 (2d ed. 1966 &
Supp. 1988) (same).
Res judicata operates to completely bar a second suit based on the same cause of action
between the same parties or those in privity with them. See 5 WK&M 1l 5011.10-5011.22.
See generally RESTATEMENT, supra, § 19 (discussing res judicata and issue preclusion). The
distinction between the two doctrines is that "res judicata precludes relitigation of all issues
whereas collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of some but not all issues." Note, The Ex-
pansion of Res Judicata in New York, 48 ALB. L. REV. 210, 213 n.13 (1983); see Schuylkill
Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306-07, 165 N.E. 456, 457 (1929)
(distinguishing between res judicata and issue preclusion); 5 WK&M 1 5011.24 (same).
In order for res judicata or issue preclusion to be invoked, there must exist "an identity
of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present
action," and the prior proceeding must have provided the litigants with "a full and fair
opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling." Schwartz v. Public Adm'r,
24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969). In order for either
doctrine to apply, therefore, there must have been an actual decision on the merits. See K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 18.08, at 368 (3d ed. 1972) (" 'res judicata' means thing
adjudicated"); see also 5 WK&M 1 5011.11, at 50-107 ("a litigant must be given his day in
court-a full opportunity to contest the merits of his cause-before he is barred from bring-
ing a second action"); Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
165, 171-72 (1969) ("irrational and unjust to bind a party by a former finding on an issue
unless that very issue had been adjudicated").
2 See Ryan, 62 N.Y.2d at 499, 467 N.E.2d at 489-90, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 825-26; Bernstein
v. Birch Wathen School, 71 App. Div. 2d 129, 132, 421 N.Y.S.2d 574, 575 (1st Dep't 1979),
aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 932, 415 N.E.2d 982, 434 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1980); see also Evans v. Monaghan,
306 N.Y. 312, 323-26, 118 N.E.2d 452, 457-58 (1954) (principle of res judicata applicable to
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings). See generally 5 WK&M 7 5011.23, at 50-157
n.210 (discussing applicability of collateral estoppel to issues resolved by arbitration).
3 See Ryan, 62 N.Y.2d at 501, 467 N.E.2d at 491, 478 N.Y.S. at 827; see also Gilberg v.
Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291, 423 N.E.2d 807, 808, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (1981) (issue preclu-
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ness,4 the doctrine has been interpreted by both courts and com-
mentators as being applicable to the adjudicatory or "quasi-judi-
cial" determinations of administrative agencies.5 Consequently, the
nature of the proceeding, as opposed to the nature of the forum, is
a controlling factor in the decision to apply issue preclusion to an
administrative determination.' Recently, in Allied Chemical Co. v.
sion is grounded "on the notion that it is not fair to permit a party to relitigate an issue...
previously... decided against him in a proceeding in which he had a fair opportunity to
fully litigate the point"). The forum in which the opportunity to litigate is provided must
employ "procedures substantially similar to those used in a court of law." Ryan, 62 N.Y.2d
at 499, 467 N.E.2d at 490, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
1 See People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64-65, 417 N.E.2d 518, 521-22, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224,
227-28 (1980) (issue preclusion must not be automatically applied but must take into con-
sideration principles of fairness); see also Schwartz, 24 N.Y.2d at 73, 246 N.E.2d at 730, 298
N.Y.S.2d at 962 (issue preclusion must not be "applied rigidly").
In Schwartz, the Court of Appeals set forth several factors which should be considered
in determining whether it would be "fair" to apply issue preclusion. Id. at 72, 246 N.E.2d at
729, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 961. These include "the size of the claim, the forum of the prior litiga-
tion, the use of initiative, the extent of the litigation, the competence and experience of
counsel, the availability of new evidence, indications of a compromise verdict, differences in
the applicable law and foreseeability of future litigation." Id. See generally 5 WK&M T
5011.42, at 50-222 ("The combination of... the offensive use of collateral estoppel and the
full and fair opportunity test, produces opportunity both for harvesting great benefits in
judicial efficiency and for creating situations that smack of fundamental unfairness and
abuse."); Herman, Rulemaking Procedures in New York, 47 ALB. L. Rav. 1051, 1075-80
(1983) (discussing application of due process requirements to agency rulemaking).
5 See Brugman v. City of New York, 102 App. Div. 2d 413, 415, 477 N.Y.S.2d 636, 638
(1st Dep't 1984) (res judicata and issue preclusion are applicable to "determinations of ad-
ministrative agencies rendered pursuant to their adjudicatory functions"), aff'd, 64 N.Y.2d
1011, 489 N.Y.S.2d 54, 478 N.E.2d 195 (1985); see also Zanghi v. Old Brookville, 752 F.2d
42, 46 (2d Cir. 1985) (issue preclusion "is applicable 'to the quasi-judicial determinations of
administrative agencies'" (quoting Ryan, 62 N.Y.2d at 496, 467 N.E.2d at 489-90, 478
N.Y.S.2d at 825-26)); Second Taxing Dist. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 683 F.2d
477, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same); Taylor v. New York City Transit Auth., 309 F. Supp. 785,
791 (E.D.N.Y.) (same), a/'d, 433 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1970); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §
83(2) comment b (supporting application of issue preclusion to administrative determina-
tions in subsequent court proceedings).
' See Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d 520, 524, 373 N.E.2d 987, 989, 402
N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1978) (doctrine of res judicata applicable to administrative determina-
tions "only if such application is consistent with the nature of the particular administrative
adjudication"); Evans, 306 N.Y. at 324, 118 N.E.2d at 458 (res judicata applicable to admin-
istrative determinations based on "the precise power being exercised, rather than from any
general distinction between courts and administrative tribunals").
An agency's quasi-judicial functions should be distinguished from its legislative powers
since res judicata does not apply to the latter. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
"Quasi-judicial" refers to the power of administrative agencies to determine the rights, du-
ties, and liabilities of particular persons based on transactions that have occurred in the
past. See Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 469, 121 N.E.2d 421, 424-25 (1954). An agency's
legislative power, on the other hand, refers to its capacity to promulgate rules and regula-
tions which operate in the future and apply to the public in general. See People v. Cull, 10
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Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,1 the New York Court of Appeals
gave preclusive effect to an agency determination possessing both
quasi-judicial and legislative ratemaking attributes, finding that
the procedural weaknesses of the administrative process did not
mandate the conclusion that a full and fair opportunity was
lacking.'
In Allied, defendant Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
("NIMO"), a regulated utility,9 contracted to purchase electricity
from plaintiff Allied Chemical Company ("Allied"), an old capacity
cogenerator. 1° Pursuant to federal regulations and subject to state
regulations, old capacity cogenerators may receive payment at a
rate of less than full avoided costs, and such a rate was agreed
upon by the parties.11 Subsequently, however, NIMO was required
by the State Public Service Commission ("PSC") to file a tariff
specifying its payment for cogenerated electricity at the higher full
avoided cost rate. 2 Allied thereafter informed NIMO that the new
tariff permitted exercise of a contract provision to charge full
avoided costs for the sale of its electricity. 3
N.Y.2d 123, 126-27, 176 N.E.2d 495, 496-97, 218 N.Y.S.2d 38, 40 (1961).
Ratemaking is one example of an agency's legislative, rather than judicial, power. See
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Pink, 288 N.Y. 359, 362, 43 N.E.2d 442, 443 (1942); New
York Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 64 App. Div. 2d 232, 238, 410 N.Y.S.2d 124, 127 (3d
Dep't 1978).
72 N.Y.2d 271, 528 N.E.2d 153, 532 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1988).
8 Id. at 277, 528 N.E.2d at 156, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
1 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1), (d), (e) (1982). Section 824 defines a regulated utility as
any person owning or operating a facility for the transmission of electrical energy in inter-
state commerce or selling electrical energy for resale. See id. The rules enacted by the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission, pursuant to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (1982) ("PURPA"), require electric utilities to purchase elec-
tricity from alternate energy sources known as "qualifying cogenerating facilities." 18 C.F.R.
§§ 292.303, 292.304 (1988). Under section 210 of PURPA, state regulatory agencies, such as
the New York Public Service Commission ("PSC"), are authorized to implement these rules.
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f) (1982).
10 Allied, 72 N.Y.2d at 275, 528 N.E.2d at 154, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 231; see 18 C.F.R. §
292.304(b)(2), (3) (1988). Cogenerators whose construction was initiated after November 9,
1978 are classified as "new capacity," and may charge a utility a rate equal to at least full
avoided costs for its service; cogenerators whose construction was initiated prior to that date
are classified as "old capacity." Allied, 72 N.Y.2d at 274, 528 N.E.2d at 154, 532 N.Y.S.2d at
231. Avoided costs are those the utility would have incurred had it produced the energy
itself or purchased the energy from a nonqualifying facility. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6)
(1988).
" Allied, 72 N.Y.2d. at 275, 528 N.E.2d at 154, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 231; 18 C.F.R. §
292.304(b)(2), (3) (1988).
12 Allied, 72 N.Y.2d at 275, 528 N.E.2d at 154, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
"3 Id. Allied contended that this new tariff provided for payment at full avoided costs
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Upon petition by NIMO,14 the PSC issued an opinion that the
new tariff did not apply to old capacity cogenerators and that Al-
lied, therefore, could not receive the new tariff rate under the mod-
ification agreement in the contract.1" The PSC, performing a quasi-
legislative function, also noted that a new plan would be adopted,
which would gradually allow old capacity cogenerators to charge a
rate of full avoided costs over a span of ten years.16 Allied then
commenced a contract action against NIMO seeking payment at
the full avoided cost rate.17  The Supreme Court, Onondaga
County, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment pri-
marily on the ground of the res judicata effect of the PSC's deter-
mination.1 8 The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed
the trial court's decision."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate
Division, holding that the PSC's determination was a "quasi-judi-
cial" adjudication and, as such, must be accorded preclusive ef-
fect.20 Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Judge Wachtler noted
that although issue preclusion may be applicable to administrative
findings,21 ascertaining whether a proceeding was "quasi-judicial"
as specified by the PSC and was an "applicable rate" within the meaning of the modifica-
tion provision in the contract. Id.
" Id. NIMO petitioned the PSC under the State Administrative Procedure Act, see
N.Y.A.P.A. § 204 (McKinney Supp. 1988), to declare that the newly filed tariff did not apply
to old capacity cogenerators, such as the one owned by Allied, and as such did not qualify as
an "applicable rate" within the meaning of the contract. Allied, 72 N.Y.2d at 275, 528
N.E.2d at 154, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 231. Allied filed a counterpetition and complaint with the
PSC, claiming that the tariff did apply to old capacity cogenerators and fell directly within
the meaning of their contract modification clause, thereby allowing it to elect to receive the
full avoided cost rate. Id.
Allied, 72 N.Y.2d at 275, 528 N.E.2d at 154, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
18 Id. at 275-76, 528 N.E.2d at 154-55, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 231-32. The PSC issued a second
statement, almost one year after the first, in order to collect and analyze comments from
those concerned with the proposal. Id. at 276, 528 N.E.2d at 155, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
17 See id. Allied did not seek review of the PSC determination in a CPLR article 78
proceeding. Id.
8 See id.
18 See id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 276-77, 528 N.E.2d at 155, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 232. The crucial issue was whether
the PSC's determination that the new tariff would not apply to old capacity cogenerators
should be given preclusive effect. Id. The Court of Appeals noted that application of issue
preclusion to an administrative determination requires: 1) an identity of issues which actu-
ally had been litigated; 2) a full and fair opportunity to litigate had been provided; and 3)
the agency had rendered its decision pursuant to its quasi-judicial capacity. Id. at 276, 528
N.E.2d at 155, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
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involves a "multi-faceted inquiry" into diverse considerations.22
One such consideration is whether giving preclusive effect to an
agency determination would be "unfair" or "unexpected. '23 The
court rejected plaintiff's contention that the PSC's decision was
legislative "ratemaking" and that applying issue preclusion would,
therefore, "be inconsistent with the PSC's scheme of administra-
tion. ' 24 The court instead framed the issue in the case as involving
a PSC determination of services rendered and payment due pursu-
ant to a contract.26
Although the Allied court set forth the proper standard for
determining when issue preclusion applies to an administrative de-
22 Id. The court focused on whether the PSC's determination was rendered in its quasi-
judicial or legislative capacity. The court noted that in order to determine when an adminis-
trative proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature, certain factors must be considered, such as
whether the agency was authorized by statute to adjudicate, whether the parties had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate all the issues, whether the parties expected to be bound by
the decision reached by the agency, and finally, whether applying issue preclusion would be
consistent with the agency's administrative function. See id. at 277, 528 N.E.2d at 155, 532
N.Y.S.2d at 232.
2 Id. at 277, 528 N.E.2d at 156, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 233. The court also noted that admin-
istrative determinations prescribing rates are legislative in nature, and in the past have not
been accorded preclusive effect. Id. at 278, 528 N.E.2d at 156, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 233; see
Second Taxing Dist. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 683 F.2d 477, 484 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1442, 1450
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Venes v. Community School Bd., 43 N.Y.2d 520, 525, 373 N.E.2d 987, 989,
402 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (1978); Consumer Protection Bd. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 97 App.
Div. 2d 320, 324, 471 N.Y.S.2d 332, 335 (3d Dep't 1983).
24 Allied, 72 N.Y.2d at 278, 528 N.E.2d at 156, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 233. In reaching its
decision, the Court of Appeals observed that the first two requirements for invoking issue
preclusion had in fact been met: there was an identity of issues in the past and present
proceedings which had been decided conclusively by the PSC, and the prior proceedings had
afforded Allied a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Id. at 277, 528 N.E.2d at 156, 532
N.Y.S.2d at 233. The plaintiff, Allied, contended that the PSC's determination involved leg-
islative ratemaking since the PSC concluded that the new tariffs, required to be filed by
regulated utilities, did not apply to all "old capacity" cogenerators in general. See id. at 278,
528 N.E.2d at 156, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 233. Such determinations were not entitled to preclusive
effect under the common law. See id. The court responded to Allied's contention by examin-
ing the policies behind not applying issue preclusion to an agency's legislative ratemaking
determination. Id. The court noted that a decision not to apply issue preclusion to ratemak-
ing was not based on the informality involved in a ratemaking proceeding, but instead, on
the nature of prospective ratemaking itself. Id. Moreover, the court stated that economic
conditions inevitably change over time and the reasonableness of the rate must be periodi-
cally reevaluated. Id.
-5 Id. at 279, 528 N.E.2d at 156-57, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 233-34. The court concluded that
the PSC's determination was a squarely defined controversy over a failure to fully pay for
electricity delivered pursuant to a contract; this required a final and conclusive disposition
and, therefore, the policy considerations for denying preclusive effect were not implicated.
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termination, it is submitted that the court applied this standard
erroneously since its decision gives preclusive effect to an agency's
legislative determination setting rates for cogenerators. Addition-
ally, by applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel too flexibly, the
court undermined the very purpose underlying issue preclusion,
which is to provide consistency in the law.26 It is therefore sug-
gested that the distinction between an agency's quasi-judicial and
legislative functions be more closely scrutinized by the courts
before they grant preclusive effect to an administrative finding.
The court in Allied correctly observed that the law will only
grant preclusive effect to administrative determinations that are
quasi-judicial in nature. 27 It is submitted, however, that the court
26 See Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 291, 423 N.E.2d 807, 808, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50
(1981); People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64, 417 N.E.2d 518, 521, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 227 (1980);
see also Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481, 485, 386 N.E.2d 1328,
1331, 414 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (1969) (issue preclusion is "necessary to conserve judicial re-
sources by discouraging redundant litigation").
217 See supra notes 2, 5, 6 and accompanying text. Federal courts applying New York
law have also applied issue preclusion to adjudicatory administrative determinations. See
Zanghi v. Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1985); Taylor v. New York City Transit
Auth., 309 F. Supp. 785, 791 (E.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 433 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1970).
The Court of Appeals refused to apply issue preclusion in two other cases decided on
the same day as Allied. See Halyalkar v. Board of Regents, 72 N.Y.2d 261, 527 N.E.2d 1222,
532 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1988); Staatsburg Water Co. v. Staatsburg Fire Dist., 72 N.Y.2d 147, 527
N.E.2d 754, 531 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1988). In Staatsburg, the court did not grant preclusive ef-
fect to a determination by the PSC regarding the adequacy of water service in a contract
action; the court regarded the determination as an "unsolicited advisory opinion" issued
beyond the scope of the PSC's adjudicatory powers since neither of the parties had filed a
formal complaint with the PSC. See 72 N.Y.2d at 153-54, 527 N.E.2d at 757, 531 N.Y.S.2d
at 879 (citing N.Y.A.P.A. § 102(3) (McKinney 1984)).
In Halyalkar, the court refused to apply issue preclusion to an administrative determi-
nation because the issue in the prior proceeding was decided pursuant to a consent order
entered upon the defendant's plea of guilty to the charge; therefore, the determination was
not rendered pursuant to any quasi-judicial functions since the matter was never actually
litigated. See 72 N.Y.2d at 269-70, 527 N.E.2d at 1226-27, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
An in-depth analysis for denying preclusive effect to an administrative legislative
ratemaking proceeding was provided in International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 444 F. Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), where the court
reasoned: "The opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses, a clear allocation of the
burden of proof, and a clear standard against which past conduct is being measured ... are
normally either not present or materially different in non-adjudicatory agency proceedings."
Id. at 1156. The court continued, stating- "A legislative body is not confined to ... issues of
past conduct, but rather, may properly consider a multitude of factors" which is inconsis-
tent with the fact-finding process of adjudication. Id. at 1158; see also American Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 449 F.2d 439, 454-55 (2d Cir. 1971) (practice of setting rates is prospective and
"no issue of damages for past acts [is] involved"; it requires "matters of statistics, econom-
ics, and expert interpretation, rather than questions of whether AT&T had violated some
norm and would thus be subject to retrospective sanctions"). See generally RESTATEMENT,
1988]
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erred in its application of the law to the facts presented. The PSC,
in Allied, was not engaged in a fact-finding process based on the
past conduct of the parties,28 but rather, was ruling whether new
tariffs were applicable to old capacity cogenerators, an essentially
legislative decision.29 In this manner, the PSC was prescribing that
old capacity cogenerators may not receive a rate equal to full
avoided costs, thereby setting a standard price applicable in the
future to all old capacity cogeneratorsY° The Court of Appeals not
only ignored this legislative aspect of the PSC's ruling, but also
disregarded the second statement issued by the PSC in adopting a
phase-in plan for all old capacity cogenerators, like Allied, to re-
ceive the full avoided cost rate. This second statement was at odds
with the PSC's earlier ruling that a full avoided cost rate did not
apply."
supra note 1, § 83(2) comment b (preclusive effect "is properly applied to administrative
adjudications of legal claims").
28 See, e.g., Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) ("A judicial inquiry
investigates, declares and enforces liabilities [between particular persons] as they stand on
present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist."); Hecht v. Monaghan, 307
N.Y. 461, 469, 121 N.E.2d 421, 425 (1954) (administrative adjudication "depends upon the
ascertainment of the existence of certain past or present facts upon which a decision is to be
made and rights and liabilities determined"); N.Y.A.P.A. § 102(3) (McKinney 1984) (adjudi-
catory proceeding is "any activity which is not a rule making proceeding.., in which a
determination of the legal rights, duties or privileges. . . is. . . made only on a record and
after an opportunity for a hearing").
29 See supra note 6. The process of ratemaking has been held to be a legislative rather
than a quasi-judicial function. See id. An agency's legislative power involves the promulga-
tion of rules and regulations enacted for the future guidance of the public in general. See id.
30 See Allied, 72 N.Y.2d at 275-76, 528 N.E.2d at 154, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 231-32; cf. Con-
sumer Protection Bd. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 97 App. Div. 2d 320, 471 N.Y.S.2d 332 (3d
Dep't 1983). In Consumer Protection, the court refused to grant preclusive effect to a deter-
mination made by the PSC which authorized the respondent utility companies to recover
certain unshared costs from their customers through rate increases. Id. at 322, 471 N.Y.S.2d
at 335. One of the respondents, Rochester Gas & Electric Corp., argued that the PSC was
not prescribing rates but was adjudicating a contract dispute between the utilities based on
facts that had occurred in the past. Id. at 324, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 335. The court rejected this
argument holding that in effect the PSC was setting rates. Id.
31 See Allied, 72 N.Y.2d at 275-76, 528 N.E.2d at 154-55, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 231-32; see
also K. DAvis, supra note 1, § 18.08, at 368. "Administrative action other than adjudication
cannot be res judicata. Even if an exercise of the rulemaking power depends on a finding of
facts, neither the rule nor the finding is regarded as res judicata." Id. (emphasis added). It
is suggested that the PSC's determination in Allied clearly involved elements of legislative
rulemaking. The PSC stated that the new tariffs, required to be filed by regulated utilities,
were not applicable to old capacity cogenerators; consequently, old capacity cogenerators
could only receive rates at less than avoided costs. See Allied, 72 N.Y.2d at 275, 528 N.E.2d
at 154, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 231. The PSC then proposed, in the same opinion, a plan which
would have allowed old capacity cogenerators to receive the full rate gradually over a period
of ten years, a statement that was inconsistent with the determination in the first part of its
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It is suggested that the Allied court, in its effort to apply the
doctrine of issue preclusion to administrative determinations, pro-
moted inconsistency in the law.3 2 In essence, the court granted
preclusive effect to an administrative legislative ratemaking pro-
ceeding, thereby contradicting the very principle it had espoused
in earlier cases.3 3 The court held that the PSC's determination in
the case at bar did not involve "prospective ratemaking" and, con-
sequently, policy issues requiring reevaluation of prescribed rates
were not implicated.3 4 The court failed to focus, however, on the
fact that the PSC's determination involved setting the applicable
rate to be applied to old capacity cogenerators. It is submitted that
this omission is inconsistent with the common law rule that preclu-
sive effect shall only be granted to an agency's determination if it
involves quasi-judicial, as opposed to legislative, rulemaking
functions. 5
The Allied court failed to give a clear and rational explanation
for its decision to treat the PSC's ratemaking determination as a
quasi-judicial function, and thus, invoked issue preclusion in a
fashion contrary to established law. It emphasized the need for
courts to consider whether issue preclusion is consistent with an
agency's "scheme of administration" and the need for "flexibility"
in reevaluating prior determinations in light of changing policy
concerns,36 but failed to adhere to this pronouncement, thereby
blurring the distinction between what is quasi-judicial and what is
legislative in the context of an administrative proceeding. It is sug-
gested that the Court of Appeals reevaluate its position with re-
spect to issue preclusion in administrative law because this kind of
"flexibility" undermines the very purpose of the doctrine: stability
opinion. See id. Apparently, the court considered a host of economic evidence as shown by
its solicitation of comments from other sources. See id. at 275-76, 528 N.E.2d at 154-55, 532
N.Y.S.2d at 231-32.
32 By applying issue preclusion to the PSC's determination, the court deviated from the
common law rule that administrative ratemaking proceedings should not be accorded
preclusive effect, see supra notes 6, 23, and it is submitted that this action denied Allied its
fundamental right to a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issues.
13 See Allied, 72 N.Y.2d at 278, 528 N.E.2d at 156, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 233. The Allied
court acknowledged that ratemaking proceedings have not been accorded preclusive effect,
and noted that "it would be illogical, and inconsistent with the agency's function, to give
preclusive effect to a prior ratemaking determination." Id.
Id. at 278-79, 528 N.E.2d at 156-57, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 233-34.
" See supra notes 2, 5, 6 and accompanying text.
See Allied, 72 N.Y.2d at 277, 528 N.E.2d at 155, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
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and consistency in the law.
Fara Agrusa
Criminal defendant is per se entitled to vacatur of his conviction
when represented by an attorney whose license is subsequently
revoked
Fundamental to the right to a fair trial under the sixth
amendment is the right of the accused to the assistance of counsel'
at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding.2 This right extends
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defence." Id.; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). "The right of
one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair
trials in some countries, but it is in ours." Id. The Gideon Court recognized the right to
counsel as essential to a fair trial and concluded that the states are required by the four-
teenth amendment to appoint counsel for indigent defendants to ensure that they receive
fair trials. See id. at 341-44. The right of indigent defendants to have counsel appointed for
them was constitutionally recognized for the first time in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
71-72 (1932). See W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.1, at 473 (student ed.
1985). The Powell Court did not focus on the right to counsel under the sixth amendment,
but instead focused on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, stating that
under the circumstances. . . the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the
failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was ... a denial of due
process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. In
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Supreme Court recognized the right of a person
charged with a crime in federal court to the assistance of counsel under the sixth amend-
ment. See id. at 462-63; W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra, § 11.1, at 475. Twenty-five years
later, the right was made obligatory in state criminal prosecutions through operation of the
fourteenth amendment. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342; W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra, § 11.1,
at 476.
2 See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970). The right to counsel attaches "at or
after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment," and is not limited to
the time of trial. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972); see Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964); see also W.
LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 11.1(b), at 484 ("The Sixth Amendment right to ap-
pointed counsel applies only to 'critical stages' in the criminal prosecution ... [where] the
'substantial rights of the accused may be affected' . ...").
Where substantial rights of the accused may be affected by a particular state criminal
procedure or statute governing criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has looked to the law
of that state to determine whether the right to the assistance of counsel has attached under
the sixth amendment. See Meadows v. Kuhhnann, 812 F.2d 72, 76-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 3188 (1987); see, e.g., Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9-10 (sixth amendment right to coun-
